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I. INTRODUCTION
"When, in the year 2099, historians will reflect on drugs
policy in the 2 0th century, they will describe it as an exam-
ple of human stupidity."1
For over two decades the United States has been waging its
war on drugs in Bolivia and other South American countries in an
unsuccessful attempt to reduce drug use within its own borders.
U.S. assistance for police and military drug enforcement efforts in
Bolivia has indeed advanced the eradication of tens of thousands
of hectares of coca leaf plantations. At first glance, it might seem
like the war on drugs in Bolivia is close to an end. Upon closer
examination, however, it is clearly evident that the laws imposed
by the war on drugs and as a result of the war have left Bolivia,
the poorest country in South America, in the grips of economic
devastation and in the wake of social upheaval.
The unintended ramifications of United States-sponsored
anti-narcotics laws in Bolivia are manifold. The impact of these
laws and enforcement mechanisms has been particularly devas-
tating for women and children, who are not the highest-ranking
concern of bureaucrats and politicians and are particularly disre-
garded by the country supplying the resources and strategy for
the war. In addition to economic deprivation, women suffer
aggression from troops who control the population through beat-
ing, raping, and abusing them. Such atrocities are excused by the
troops' duty to enforce Bolivia's harsh anti-narcotics laws. Hun-
dreds of innocent children also suffer the consequences of the war
on drugs, spending months and years of their precious childhood
in prison along with their mothers and fathers, victims them-
selves of unconstitutional, mandatory sentencing provisions of the
anti-narcotics law.
This article explores in greater depth the inadvertent effects
of anti-narcotics laws in Bolivia. It will first briefly discuss
Bolivia's economy and culture in an effort to explain how and why
1. Drugs and Development #19, THE MONTHLY NEWSLETTER OF ENCOD
(European NGO Council on Drugs and Dev., Borgerhout, Belg.), Dec. 1999, available
at http://www.tni.org/drugsencod/dydl9.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2001).
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it became a target in the international war on drugs led by the
United States. The article will then describe the main anti-nar-
cotics regulations and policy in Bolivia as a backdrop to the dis-
cussion of the unintended consequences of crop eradication
measures on women, children, and overall society as exemplified
in demonstrations and protests led by affected Bolivians. Finally,
it will present some recommendations as to how to ameliorate the
grave consequences that the Bolivian anti-narcotics policy has on
the country's most vulnerable and affected citizens.
II. UNITED STATES' WAR ON DRUGS: BOLIVIA AS ONE OF
ITS MAIN TARGETS
The "War on Drugs" in the United States began in approxi-
mately 1972, when President Nixon declared drugs "public enemy
number one."2 The war escalated when President Reagan and for-
mer President Bush took it to its international dimensions, imple-
menting a supply-side strategy of suppression of drugs through
crop eradication and the disruption of trafficking channels. The
focus of this strategy was and continues to be the Andean nations
of Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia.' In 1986, drug trafficking was
labeled a threat to U.S. national security, thereby justifying the
United States' financing of counter-narcotics efforts.4 Bolivia's
status as one of the world's three leading producers of the coca
plant makes it a major "enemy" of the American war.' Since for-
2. See Maia Szalavitz, War on Drugs, War on Women, reprinted in The
Lindesmith - DRUG POLICY FOUNDATION ONLINE LIBRARY (1999), at http://
www.lindesmith.org/library/szalavitz2.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2001).
3. See Melanie R. Halloms, Note, Bolivia and Coca: Law, Policy, and Drug
Control, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 817, 819 (1997). Supply suppression strategies for
drug control have garnished support in most parts of the world. Illicit drug control
problems in high demand countries are not likely to be solved through the
continuation of such strategies: "[diespite the expenditure of billions of dollars on
controlling supplies, the successful capture of major traffickers and dismantling of
their drug empires ... the global supply and consumption of drugs has continued to
grow." Policy Options: What Is To Be Done?, ILLICIT DRUGS: SOCIAL IMPACTS AND
POLICY RESPONSES (United Nations Research Inst. for Soc. Dev., Geneva,
Switzerland), at httpi/www.unrisd.org/engindex/publist/bp/bp2/bp02-04.htm (last
visited Sept. 7, 2001).
4. Human Rights and the War on Drugs, Andean Information Network, at http://
www.scbbs-bo.comnain/ain/details/ddrugs.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2001).
5. During 2000, Bolivia's production of the coca leaf and cocaine consistently fell
behind that of Colombia and Peru. See generally 2000 Country Reports, U.S. Dept. of
State, available at http://www.state.gov/g/inllrls/nrcrpt2000/index.cfm?docid=883
(last visited Sept. 24, 2001). Colombia is "the world leader in the production of
cocaine entering the U.S ..." During 2000 and 2001, the Clinton administration gave
$1.2 billion in counter narcotics funds to Colombia, approximately eighty percent of
2002]
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mer President Bush launched the Andean Initiative in 1989,
Bolivia has received more than $800 million in antinarcotics
support.'
A. A Closer Look at Bolivia
A brief look at Bolivia's geography, economy, and society is nec-
essary at this point in order to understand the consequences of
drug control policy and enforcement on its society.
1. Bolivia, a Snapshot
Bolivia, a landlocked nation, is one of the least-developed
countries in South America.7 About two-thirds of the population
lives in poverty, many of its members being subsistence farmers.'
Agriculture accounts for roughly fifteen percent of Bolivia's gross
national product ("GDP").' The extraction of minerals and hydro-
carbons accounts for another ten percent of the GDP, while manu-
facturing represents less than seventeen percent of the GDP.10 To
finance development projects, Bolivia is heavily dependent on for-
eign assistance." At the end of 1998, the government owed $4.3
billion to its foreign creditors, most of the balance owed to multi-
lateral development banks and $1.6 billion owed to other govern-
ments. 2 The Unites States is Bolivia's largest trading partner. 13
2. Bolivia's Culture and Coca's Role in Bolivia's Heritage
Bolivia's particularly distinct culture is characterized by the
highest indigenous population in the Americas, with fifty-six to
seventy percent indigenous people (primarily Quechua and
Aymara). 4 Only sixty to seventy percent of the population speaks
which was for military equipment and training. See Andrew Miller, Colombia in
Crisis, FOREIGN POLICY IN Focus (May 2001), at http://www.fpif.org/briefs/vol6/
v6n20colombia body.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2001).
6. Jacqueline Williams, Waging the War on Drugs in Bolivia, TNI "DRUGS &
DEMOCRACY": RELATED LINS AND DOCUMENTATION, at http://www.tni.org/drugs/links-
boldrg.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2001).
7. 2000 Country Reports, supra note 6. "Not only is it [Bolivia] landlocked, it's
one of the most roadless countries in the Americas." Destinations, Basic Bolivia.
What's Bolivia about?, GREAT OUTDOOR RECREATION PAGES, at http://www.gorp.com/
gorp/location/latamer/bolivia/basicb.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2001).









Spanish, the country's official language, and frequently as a sec-
ond language. Indigenous groups in Bolivia have traditionally
used the coca leaf since pre-colonial times for a variety of pur-
poses, including religious and cultural rituals, chewing it after
meals as a social event, and using it for tea ("mate de coca") and
for medicinal purposes. 5 The coca leaf is considered a gift from
the Sun god to the Andean indigenous people.16 "Coca is a sacred
symbol of the mother earth."17
The cultivation of coca for illicit drug production "was not a
spontaneous change in agricultural practices on the part of Boliv-
ian coca farmers (cocaleros); rather, it resulted from a combination
of political, economic, and social factors." i" Out of economic neces-
sity, many unemployed workers moved to the rural areas to avail
themselves of the jobs and profits offered by illegal coca cultiva-
tion.19 "During the 1980s, the illegal coca economy surpassed the
traditional legal coca market," bringing Bolivia to the forefront of
U.S. targets in its escalating war on drugs.2"
B. United States' War on Drugs at the International
Level
The international scope of the U.S. war on cocaine was
heightened under the Reagan Administration. International drug
control programs targeting the source of production with an
emphasis on the eradication of coca fields and interdiction were
implemented and enforced through the Foreign Assistance Act,
amended in 1986 to allow it to suspend economic aid to countries
uncooperative in the U.S. drug effort.2'
15. Halloms, supra note 3, at 823. "Coca . . .is the sacred leaf of the Andean
people. Cocaine... is a harmful drug that causes serious problems throughout the
world." Coca is not Cocaine, Andean Information Network, at http'i/www.scbbs-
bo.com/ain/ain/details/dcocaine.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2002).
16. Coca is not Cocaine, supra note 15. "Coca is indeed a godsend among the
harsh and high environments of the Andes as it relieves altitude sickness and gives a
sense of increased energy and strength." Id.
17. Lesley Mackay, Bolivia's Women Farmers Refuse to Pay the Price for U.S. Drug
Policies, Ms MAGAziNE (online through the Media Awareness Project, Porterville, CA),
Aug. 1, 2001, available at http://www.mapinc.org/drugnews/v011n1432/aOl.html?397
(last visited Feb. 1, 2002) (quoting Leonilda Zurita, leader of the women farmers'
unions in the region of Cochabamba).
18. Hallums, supra note 3, at 824. Hallums describes how each of these factors
contributed to the rise in export-oriented coca production in Bolivia. Id.
19. Id. at 826. The three areas that yield most of Bolivia's coca are the Yungas in
La Paz, the Chapare in Cocachamba, and the Yapacani in Santa Cruz. Id.
20. Id.
21. See Prohibitions on Security Assistance: Prohibitions on assistance in the FAA
2002]
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1. Certification Process
Every year by the 1" of March, the President of the United
States is required to certify whether major drug producing or traf-
ficking countries are fully cooperating with U.S. anti-narcotic pol-
icy. Cooperation is demonstrated by evidence of commitment and
success in fighting the war on drugs through crop eradication and
drug control policy implementation and enforcement.2 A country
that is not certified is subject to various sanctions, including
"withdrawal of U.S. aid not directly related to anti-narcotics pro-
grams, U.S. oppositions to loans from the multilateral develop-
ment banks like the World Bank, and possible trade sanctions.""
Drug certification policy is resented in Latin America as arbitrary
and in violation of countries' national sovereignty.
2 4
The certification process "translates into extreme pressure to
produce numbers demonstrating success in the drug war."25
Dependent on foreign aid for the implementation of structural
adjustment programs and other economic revitalization programs,
countries must pass anti-drug laws if they want to be eligible to
receive such aid. In Bolivia, the process of certification judges the
country in part by the amount of crops that are eradicated and by
the number of arrests made as proof of enforcement of anti-narcot-
ics laws. Under pressure to maintain certification, President
Hugo Banzer Suarez militarized the Chapare coca-growing region
in order to meet the aggressive eradication goal of eliminating all
illicit coca from Bolivia by 2002.27 Human rights and the due pro-
and AECA, THE CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL POLICY, available at http://
www.ciponline.org/facts/eligib.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2001).
22. See id. (explaining how the law defines cooperation with U.S. counternarcotics
efforts).
23. Annual Drug Certification Process - Time for a Change, WASHINGTON OFFICE
ON LATIN AMERICA (on file with author), available at http://www.wola.org (last visited
Sept. 24, 2001).
24. See Failing to make the grade, The Case Against U.S. Drug Certification
Policy, WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA, available at httpJ/www/wola.org/
drugpolfailing,html (February 1999) (last visited Oct. 1, 2001). The author argues
that the certification policy has been ineffective for drug control and should be ended
by Congress. See id. Certification is perceived as a hypocritical judgment by the
world's largest consumer of illegal drugs. Id. Moreover, " ... the certification process
erodes the very sense of common purpose and partnership that must be the
foundation of international cooperation on any issue." Id.
25. Certification, ANDEAN INFORMATION NETWORK, at httpJ/www.scbbs-bo.com/ain/
ain/details/dcertification.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2001).





cess of law have been undermined by the focus on the amount of
arrests made to meet quotas, with United States-sponsored secur-
ity forces abusing and torturing peasants during eradication
efforts.2" "[I he tremendous U.S. political pressure on the Boliv-
ian government to meet the yearly coca eradication deadlines
pushes human rights concerns to the bottom of the list of priorities
for Bolivian anti-narcotics forces."29
U.S. policy-makers share criticisms of certification provisions.
In 1997, the Senate nearly approved suspension of certification for
two years, with top Clinton administration officials opposing the
process." On January 30, 2001, a bill was introduced in the Sen-
ate "it] o suspend for two years the certification procedures ... in
order to foster greater multilateral cooperation in international
counter narcotics programs. . . ."" The bill states that the annual
certification process is not currently effective because its provi-
sions are inconsistently applied and because it "alienates the very
allies whose cooperation we [the U.S.] seek." It further proposes
a multilateral strategy to replace the unilateral policy of review.33
Repealing the certification process would give countries under its
review greater confidence and trust in U.S. efforts, setting a path
for mutual cooperation rather than imposition of demands in
exchange for much needed monetary aid. More importantly, "it
would allow us to turn attention to the domestic roots of our drug
problem - to preventing and treating drug abuse and addiction in
our own backyards."34
2. Monetary Assistance to Certified Countries
Upon certification, countries eligible for U.S. security assis-
tance programs receive funding from both the Department of
Defense and the Department of State through authority granted
by the Defense Appropriations Act and the Foreign Operations
Appropriations Act. U.S security assistance to the Andean Region
reached its highest peak in 2000 and 2001 with an aid package of
28. Id.; see generally George Ann Potter & Linda Farthing, Bolivia: Eradication
and Backlash, Policy Brief (Foreign Policy in Focus), at http://www.foreignpolicy-
infocus.org/briefs/vol5/v5n38boliviabody.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2001). The zero
coca option in the Chapare has resulted in more than 100 civilians killed or wounded
in recent clashes with the police and the military. Id.
29. Human Rights and the War on Drugs, supra note 4.
30. See Annual Drug Certification Process - Time for a Change, supra note 23.
31. S. Res. 219, 107' Cong. (2001) (enacted).
32. Id. § l(a)(7).
33. See id. § 1(b)(2).
34. Failing to Make the Grade, The Case Against U.S. Drug Certification Policy,
supra note 24.
13320021
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$1.3 billion, ninety percent of which is allocated to Colombia,
Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia." Assistance comes in various forms,
generally categorized as military/police assistance and economic/
social assistance. Funded activities under the first category
include International Military Education and Training, Foreign
Military Financing, International Narcotics and Law Enforce-
ment, and International Peacekeeping Capabilities. 6 Under the
second category, in addition to economic aid grants under the Eco-
nomic Support Fund, aid is given to fund Drug Interdiction and
Counter-Drug Activities among other things. 7 Bolivia received
$110 million in assistance in 2000, $25 million for the police and/
or military, and $85 million for alternative development. Assis-
tance grants are being used for the enforcement of measures for
the continuing goal of eradication of coca by 2002.'
III. LAW 1008
The paramount anti-narcotics law in Bolivia is Law 1008,
implemented on July 19, 1988, under pressure from the U.S. gov-
ernment.5 The law has been harshly and rightly criticized by
human rights groups, political activists, and Bolivian cocaleros,
"with the most frequent adjective to describe the law being draco-
nian."41 Law 1008 is criticized on three fronts: that it is unconsti-
35. See Colombia - Overview: U.S. Security Assistance to the Andean Region,
2000-2001, THE CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL POLICY, available at http://
www.ciponline.org/facts/co.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2001). The package was passed
as an "emergency supplemental appropriation" - a measure that permits the
administration to spend money exceeding that which was initially budgeted. Id.
36. See Foreign Military Training, ARMS TRADE OVERSIGHT PROJECT (Council for a
Livable World, Washington, DC) at http://www.clw.org/atop/training.html (last
visited Sept. 15, 2001).
37. See id.
38. See U.S. Support for Plan Colombia, THE CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL POLICY,
available at http://www.ciponline.org/facts/coaid.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2002).
39. See infra p. 13 and note 69.
40. See Law 1008, ANDEAN INFORMATION NETWORK, at http://www.scbbs-bo.com/
ain/ain/details/dlawlO08.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2001). "The law defines the legal
status of coca cultivation and its relationship with the illegal drug cocaine." Id.
Critics argue that the Coca and Controlled Substances Law, Law 1008, was written
with the assistance of the U.S. Agency for International Development to ensure that
narcotrafficking would be defined a crime and that illegal coca cultivation would be
eradicated. See David E. Dubberly, Commentary on the Ley del Regimen de la Coca y
Sustancias Controladas, 6 American Bar Association: Inter-American Legal
Materials 278 (1995), available at http://www.natlaw.com/pubs/spbocsl.htm (last
visited Sept. 24, 2001). "In 1988 the Reagan administration froze fifty percent of U.S.
aid until the Bolivian Congress approved the law." Law 1008, supra note 40.
41. Dubberly, supra note 40 (emphasis added). See also Jim Shultz, War On
Drugs Becomes War on Poor, SACRAMENTO BEE (online through the Media Awareness
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tutional and in violation of international law; that it is
discriminatory against poor, mostly rural peasants; and that it is
threatening to national sovereignty and to cultural traditions
associated with the coca leaf.
A. Procedural Characteristics of Law 1008
Law 1008 creates a separate justice system, made up of the
Controlled Substance Courts (Juzgados de Sustancias Contro-
ladas), Controlled Substance Judges (Juezes de Sustancias Con-
troladas), and Controlled Substance Prosecutors (Fiscales de
Substancias Controladas) assigned only to narcotics offenses.42
The sentencing provisions are mandatory - the prosecutor may
not request and the judge may not impose a sentence outside what
is proscribed by law.43 Often, the only evidence submitted at trial
against the accused are the reports by anti-narcotic police, taken
as proof automatically admissible at trial, effectively allowing
anti-narcotic police to carry out what should be judicial determi-
nations.44 Most importantly, Law 1008 prohibits provisional
release, "mandating incarceration of prisoners (including those
acquitted by a lower court) until the Supreme Court has made a
ruling."45
A common narcotics prosecution proceeds as follows: first, the
"operativo" or arrest stage, when the Special Counter Narcotics
Force (Fuerza Especial de Lucha Contra el Narcotrdfico) arrests
the suspect and seizes assets.4" Suspects may be held for a maxi-
Project, Porterville, CA), available at http://www.mapinc.org/drugnews/
v99.n795.a03.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2001) ("Bolivia's notorious Law 1008, a
Draconian statute.. . ."; Mackay, supra note 17 ("[Dlrug wars have.. subjected coca
farmers to draconian anti-drug laws."); Potter & Farthing, supra note 28 ("[Tjhe U.S.
promoted the passage of the draconian Bolivian Law 1008 ... "
42. See Dubberly, supra note 40.
43. Id.
44. See Theo Roncken, Bolivia: Impunity and the Control of Corruption in the
Fight Against Drugs, DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND MILITARISM IN THE WAR ON
DRUGS IN LATIN AMERICA (1997), at http://www.tni.org/drugs/folderl/roncken.htm
(last visited Spert. 24, 2001).
45. Dubberly, supra note 40. "As the unconvicted (or worse EXONERATED by a
lower court) prisoner waits through the years of process, without the possibility of
bail, in an unsanitary, overcrowded jail, it appears that their fundamental rights
were forgotten." Id.
46. See id. The Special Counternarcotics Force ("FELCN") was created in July
1987 by presidential decree, supported in the rural areas by the Mobile Rural Patrol
Unit (Unidad Movil de Patrullaje Rural) ("UMOPAR") and by some units of the
Armed Forces. FELCN and UMOPAR, the lead forces in the war against coca and
cocaine, are trained and directed by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency and are
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mum of forty-eight hours without being charged." The decision to
go to trial is then entirely in the hands of the prosecutor, not the
judge. 8 The prosecutor prepares a request for indictment to be
submitted to the Controlled Substances Trial Court, having no
discretion to request a sentence outside that set out by law.49 The
indictment is then sent to the penal chamber of the Appellate
Court for review, approval, or rejection, and passed back to the
Controlled Substance Trial Court.5° The sentence is passed to the
Appellate Court for review - with permissible appeals limited to
those set out by the law (questions of prejudice, for example, are
impermissible).5 1 In the event that there is an acquittal, the pros-
ecutor has the obligation to file an appeal to the Supreme Court.52
Ironically, this process was designed to speed up the prosecution
of narcotics offenses. "Strictly following the procedures as codi-
fied, a case from arrest to the time of sentencing by the Supreme
Court should last 111 days .. . ."1 In truth, " . . . a typical case
usually lasts an average of three to four years before there is a
final sentence."5
B. Criticisms of Law 1008
1. Law 1008 is unconstitutional and violates international
law
Critics argue that by prohibiting provisional liberty, Law
1008 effectively creates a system whereby the accused is pre-
sumed guilty until proven innocent, in total contravention of the
presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Bolivian Constitution
and international human rights law.55 The law thus raises ques-
tions both of constitutionality and of consistency with interna-
tional law.
The requirement that all accused remain incarcerated
throughout the entire judicial process contravenes the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which declares, in
completely dependent on U.S. embassy officials for intelligence and planning. See
Roncken, supra note 44.
47. See Dubberly, supra note 40.




52. See Dubberly, supra note 40.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See id; see also Law 1008, supra note 40; Hallums, supra note 3, at 833 n.87
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part, "[ilt shall not be the general rule that persons awaiting trial
shall be detained in custody, but release may be subject to guaran-
tees to appear for trial, at any other stage of the judicial proceed-
ings, and, should occasion arise, for execution of the judgment."
6
More notorious is the requirement of incarceration after acquittal.
"In the absence of a supplementary accusation or another valid
reason, the continued detention of the accused is arbitrary."7 The
Law, in its application, might also be in violation of the ICCPR
requirement of a trial within a reasonable time because of the
lengthy time period between trials and appeals."
2. Law 1008 Discriminates Against the Poor
Law 1008 is also flawed by its discriminatory effect against
the poor. "Although the intent of the law was to provide a mecha-
nism to punish narcotraffickers who exploit the poor and bring
violence and crime to Bolivia, in reality it is the poor who feel the
brunt of the law."59 Prominent cocaine producers and traffickers,
if caught, are wealthy enough to buy their freedom. The penalties
of the law are felt most harshly by the underclass that produces or
transports small quantities of cocaine, people who live off the low-
est end of drug trafficking. Having no means to pay their way out
of a corrupt system, they "carry all the weight of the 'excesses'
associated with Law 1008. "6° In a constant need to demonstrate
high arrest statistics for certification purposes, special drug police
forces make arrests by the numbers. 1 Surprisingly, there is no
correlation between a higher number of arrests and drug
seizures.2 The people being arrested, the "transport mules" and
poor farmers who cultivate coca, are sadly "readily replaceable
commodities subject to manipulation by the real narcos," and are
56. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA. Res. 2200A (XXI),
U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered
into force Mar. 23, 1976., art. 9 § 3 [hereinafter ICCPR].
57. Encausamiento Penal Segun la Ley 1008, VIOLACIONES A LOS DERECHOS
HuMANos Y LA GUERRA ANTI-DRoGAS (Human Rights Watch, New York, NY),
available at http://www.hrw.org/spanish/informes/1995/bolivia3.html (last visited
Sept. 24, 2001).
58. See ICCPR, supra note 56.
59. Dubberly, supra note 40. The Andean Information Network labels this
problem as "the greatest tragedy of Law 1008 and the 'War on Drugs' in Bolivia; the
coca growers and other poor citizens of Bolivia are the ones who suffer. They lose
years of their lives in prison to meet U.S. expectations of incarceration rates and to
construct the appearance of a war that s being won." Law 1008, supra, note 40.
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indeed easily replaced by more victims of poverty. 3
3. Law 1008 is a Threat to Bolivia's National Sovereignty
Many Bolivians view Law 1008 as a threat to national sover-
eignty.' Bolivians take pride in their traditions, including the
widespread use of coca for religious and social purposes. Although
the law takes into account the cultural use of coca, eradication
goals are perceived as a threat to cultural practices like chewing of
the coca leaf or its use for tea.6" Moreover, the United States'
instrumental role in the drafting and enforcement of the law is
viewed as a foreign imposition - hence its common referral as the
"Law of Foreigners."66 The law is criticized as "inconsistent with
Indian traditions and Bolivian constitutional norms."6' The U.S.
embassy and U.S. financial support are the main obstacles to the
Law's amendment, further reason for criticism of the war on drugs
as a threat to the nation's sovereignty. The sentiment of Evo
Morales, head of the cocaleros union, is thus shared by many: "[t]
he fight against drug trafficking is a pretext for the U.S. to domi-
nate ... our people - to violate our sovereignty."'
IV. PLAN DIGNIDAD
A new campaign for the complete eradication of all illegal coca
began in 1997. "Plan Dignidad" (Dignity Plan) is a five-year plan
introduced by then President Hugo Banzer Suarez to eradicate
the cultivation of all illegal coca by 2002.69 The Plan receives U.S.
financial, intelligence, and military support. The campaign's
effects have been felt the most in the Chapare region, an area that
provided much of the world's cocaine supply until the introduction
63. Dubberly, supra note 40.
64. Hallums, supra note 3, at 834.
65. See id.
66. Id. at 835.
67. See id.; see also Encausamiento Penal Segun la Ley 1008, supra note 57.
68. James Reynolds, Bolivia Wages the War on the Coca Leaf, BBC NEWS (June 9,
2000) at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/englishlworld/americas/newsid_778000/778100.stm
(last visited Sept. 7, 2001).
69. See Human Rights and the War on Drugs, supra note 4; see also
Representative Benjamin Gilman, Remarks at the opening of the Fourth
Transatlantic Inter-Parliamentarian Conference of Drug Control, Santa Cruz,
Bolivia, (Feb. 21, 2001), available at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/global/drugs/
01022103.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2001) (stating "President Banzer and Vice
President Quiroga... underscored that by the year 2002 there will be no more cocaine
coming out of Bolivia." ).
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of the Plan.7" Under Law 1008 the eradication of coca was to be
accomplished gradually through voluntary eradication in
exchange for compensation and crop substitution.' Under the
Plan, however, the goal is to move from individual to community
compensation, with the complete elimination of compensation
within five years. 2 The Plan also calls for relocation of 5000 fami-
lies.73 Most debated, however, is the prevalent use of violence as a
means of meeting the zero coca goal.
The campaign has indeed proved successful in eradicating
coca from the Chapare region. Anti-narcotics forces have suc-
ceeded in eradicating tens of thousands of hectares of coca-leaf
plantations in the Chapare.74 By the end of 2000, all commercially
significant coca fields were eliminated from the Chapare. In 2000,
Plan Dignidad "reduced coca cultivation by thirty-three percent
nationwide- and by over ninety percent in the Chapare" region.75
Based on the apparent success of the eradication program, the
U.S. Department of State affirms, "Bolivia continues to be the
model for the region in coca eradication."76
How did such success come about? Unfortunately, the success
in eradication has come about at the expense of militarization of
the region and numerous instances of armed conflict and human
rights abuses. Law 1008 was more strictly enforced after 1997,
causing an increase in the inmate population by the hundreds.7
Military forces and UMOPAR have been forcibly eradicating coca
in the Chapare.78 They conduct special operatives, continually
trespassing into private property, particularly the land of the
cocaleros, going house by house day and night, "screaming, throw-
ing our belongings, intimidating and terrorizing the citizens."
Coca is not the only thing that has been eradicated in the advent
of Plan Dignidad; human rights and the citizens' trust in the gov-
ernment and the police have also been destroyed in the interim.
70. See generally 2000 Country Reports, supra note 5.
71. Human Rights and the War on Drugs, supra note 4.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See generally id. In 2000, 7,500 hectares of Chapare coca were eradicated,
leaving less than 600 hectares by the end of the year. Id.
75. See id.
76. Id.
77. See Mackay, supra note 17.
78. See Reynolds, supra note 68.
79. Encausamiento Penal Segun la Ley 1008, supra note 57.
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V. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF ANTI-NARCOTICS
POLICY IN BOLIVIA
Anti-narcotics policies in Latin America have given rise to a
myriad of human rights violations. Pressure on foreign govern-
ments by the United States and the international community to
eradicate illegal drug production and trafficking through the
enforcement of extremely harsh laws has failed to create a net for
social problems arising out of such enforcement. In drafting Law
1008 and executing Plan Dignidad, systemic corruption of
Bolivia's judicial system and Bolivia's characteristic classicist soci-
ety was not considered in how the law might affect different seg-
ments of Bolivian population. As discussed above, Law 1008 is
disproportionably enforced against the poor. The increased mili-
tary presence in the Chapare region has led to abuse, harassment,
torture, and even instances of murder by anti-narcotics forces."0
Notably, the injustices resulting from the war on drugs in Bolivia
are most apparent in its effect on the female population.
A. Inadvertent Consequences of Anti-narcotics
Measures on Women and Children
In discussing the consequences of the war on drugs on women
in the United States, one commentator points out how "[i]n the
drug war, women's concerns have historically been ignored, dis-
missed, or exploited."8 This notion is even more applicable to the
war on drugs at the international level. Women's concerns in
countries outside the Unites States are particularly underscored
because it is a foreign country's nationals who are affected by how
the war is fought on foreign land while the United States imposes
the adoption of laws abroad with no regard for cultural and social
differences that might impact how the laws are actually enforced
in a society with particular gender norms and beliefs. In the case
of Bolivia, women (particularly poor women of indigenous decent)
as well as children, suffer grave effects of the war on drugs due to
their respective social and economic positions.
80. See Potter & Farthing, supra note 28. The Amnesty International 2001 report
on Bolivia states that "human rights violations . . . in el Chapare increased ...
security forces reportedly us[ing] excessive and arbitrary force against groups of
demonstrators ... in protest at government policies. Ten people died and more than
100 were injured." Bolivia, Amnesty Int'l Report 2001, available at http://
www.amnesty.org. (last visited Oct. 1, 2001).
81. Szalavitz, supra note 2.
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1. Overwhelming Exposure to Military Oppression and
Abuse
In terms of military abuse, women are the most affected. One
woman's account exemplifies one of the consequences of the 7000
troops in the Chapare region undertaking Plan Dignidad: "[tihe
men, our husbands, flee to the mountains for fear of arrest; and
we stay with our children and suffer the abuse."82 Instances of
abuse and torture by the FELCN and UMOPAR are routine. In
the Chapare, UMOPAR abuses the population, raiding their
homes in the middle of the night, searching them against their
will, mistreating and sometimes injuring them while stealing
their property.83
Aggression from troops is mostly suffered by women, not only
because they cannot flee like their husbands since they have to
attend to their children, but also because of the sociological role of
women in Bolivia and the relation of power resulting from their
interaction with anti-narcotics forces. In the Chapare, "'[t] he
armed forces feel the need to control the population through
women .... After all, the women are a real political force. ""4 Thus,
troops have been accused of everything from beating women to
raping them to detaining them arbitrarily."" The FELCN and
UMOPAR commit these violations with virtual impunity, as there
is no administrative or judicial mechanism to investigate, prevent,
or punish the occurrences of such abuses. In addition, systematic
practices and other factors lead to an unregulated anti-narcotics
force, financed by the United States, practically immune from
punishment or control.86
82. Leonilda Vargas, WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM
SPEAKING ToUR 1999 (Women's International League for Peace and Freedom,
Philadelphia, PA) at http://www.igc.org/colhrnet/newsletter/y1999/winter99art/
wilpf.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2001).
83. See Resumen y Recomendaciones, VIOLACIONES A LOS DERECHOS HumAos Y LA
GuEaPA ANTI-DROGAS (Human Rights Watch, New York, NY), available at http://
www.hrw.org/spanish/informes/1995/bohvia.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2001).
84. Mackay, supra note 17.
85. See id.
86. See Abusos Fuera del Chapare, VIOLACIONES A LOS DEREcHOS HUmANos Y LA
GuEm ANTI-DROGAS (Human Rights Watch, New York, NY), available at http://
www.hrw.org/spanish/informes/1995/bolivia4.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2001).
Systemic factors conducive to virtual impunity of the forces include an established
pattern of abusive conduct by the police against the poorer sectors of society, stalled
attempts by the government and private organizations to inform the public about
their rights, inability of victims of abuse to make detailed complaints, fear of
retaliation, and lack of a public entity with sufficient resources to investigate reports
of abuse and to bring abusers to justice. Id.
2002]
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:1
2. Overcrowding of Prisons and Inhumane Living
Conditions for Women and Children
The impact of Law 1008 in the prisons of Bolivia has been
acute, particularly after the introduction of Plan Dignidad. The
prison system was not expanded to keep up with the number of
detainees brought in under Law 1008. Incarceration during the
entire trial and appellate process of a drug charge has caused the
prisons to be filled beyond capacity, 7 under conditions"... well
below the international minimum standards" amounting to "cruel,
degrading, or inhuman treatment.""' The prison of San Sebastian,
where half the inmates have sentences related to Law 1008, was
designed to hold sixty people, yet holds over five hundred now."9
Lack of space translates into inmates sleeping on the floor and
hallways, inadequate food supply, and lack of medical services."
As Human Rights Watch observes: "[e] ven though the miserable
conditions of Bolivian prisons are not a necessary or planned con-
sequence of the incarceration for trafficking under Law 1008, the
lack of necessary attention and financing constitute an inevitable
and expected consequence."9'
Prison overcrowding is due to more than just an increased
number of arrests made under Law 1008. The women's jail in San
Sebastifin (where most arrestees from the Chapare region end up)
is especially overcrowded partly because of the arbitrary police
and military sweeps characteristic of Plan Dignidad eradication.92
The remainder of the jail's inhabitants are incarcerated as an
indirect consequence of Law 1008; in addition to 320 prisoners,
the jailhouses 250 children who only have their incarcerated
mothers to care for them.9" They too have to pay the price of the
87. According to Bolivian human rights groups, more than 1,000 of the nearly
1,400 prisoners jailed in Cocachamba have never been sentenced. A Bolivian Baby
Turns One in Jail - C O The U.S. War On Drugs, THE DEMOCRACY CENTER ON-LINE
(The Democracy Center, San Francisco, CA), at http://www.democracyctr.org/
onlinenews/Vol_28.html (Aug. 2, 1999) (last visited Sept. 24, 2001).
88. Bolivia, supra note 80.
89. See Encausamiento Penal Segun la Ley 1008, supra note 57.
90. Prisons are a microcosm of Bolivian society, where money can buy inmates
royalty treatment. In the Cocachamba jails, for example, "cash will buy you a private
cell with carpeting, cable television, a cell phone and police willing -for a price- to
bring everything from alcohol to women. The poor sleep on cold patios, unless they
can come up with $300 (a half year's salary here) to buy a bed-sized cell." A Bolivian
Baby Turns One in Jail - CIO The U.S. On Drugs supra, note 81.
91. Encausamiento Penal Segun la Ley 1008, supra note 57.





The Cocachamba woman's prison, like many in Bolivia, is
filled with the prisoners' youngest children. Mothers and
children live often seven or eight in a small cell meant for
one or two. Since the prison is overcrowded -built to hold
128 people, it now has nearly 600 crammed into it - cells
are a rare and expensive commodity. A woman who has a
cell but can no longer afford it may sell it to someone else
and sleep in the courtyard, where those with little or no
money live. 4
The challenges women in prison face for mere survival are
inhumane, particularly when notice is taken that a great number
of them have not even had the opportunity of being heard at trial.
Women in jail must earn money for food and bed. To earn it they
cook meals, make clothing to sell to people outside the prison, sell
necessities to other inmates, or wash the clothing of people outside
the prison. Inmates with less seniority who need to wash clothes
for a living in the prison must do the washing during the night,
still taking turns with others in the same precarious condition. 5
The thought that prisons in Bolivia are filled not only with
lawbreakers but also, in many cases, with their complete immedi-
ate family is almost surreal. 6 "Law 1008 never considered chil-
dren, much less families."97 When either the father or the mother
or both are imprisoned they are taken to the city, their property
left behind and abandoned, and the only method of caring for the
children becomes keeping the family together inside the prison.
As a consequence, at the beginning of 1998 approximately 2200
children lived in Bolivia's seventeen prisons.98 The Bolivian gov-
94. Id.
95. See id. One woman who ran out of money to feed her children was forced to
sell her bed, wake up at 2:00a.m. to wash clothes, sell rolls, sew, and again wash some
more. Another female prisoner sleeps in the corner of a stairwell with her two
daughters, one who suffers from anemia. The reason why she was incarcerated -
carrying powdered lime (which can be used to make cocaine and is thus punishable
under Law 1008) for the purpose of making paint. See id.
96. See Elizabeth Schwimmer, Los Nifios de la Ley 1008, REBELION - DERECHOS
HumANos (Red Andina de Informacion, Cocachamba, Bolivia), at http://
www.rebelion.org/ddhh/ninos220401.htm (April 22, 2001), (last visited Sept. 24,
2001).
97. Id.
98. Mike Ceaser, In Bolivia, Children Often Live With Their Fathers in Prison,
THE MIAmi HERALD, Dec. 17, 1998, available at www.rose-hulman.edu/-delacova/
bolivia/prison.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2001). Children like Delsy, who "goes to
school each morning, studies six hours and then goes home to play with her friends -
in prison, where she lives among murderers, rapists, drug dealers and thieves." Id.
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ernment implemented a program called "Prisons without Child-
hood" to relocate children and their families outside of prisons
that effectively reduced the number of children sharing prison
cells.99 Yet, by the end of 2000 there were still about 350 children
in jail.10° The lack of government- sponsored children services pro-
grams and an established foster care system makes parents fear-
ful that their children will turn into "street kids," preferring
instead to keep the family together inside the prisons.
3. Economic Consequences of Eradication Measures on
Women
Women farmers have suffered the worst blow from the eco-
nomic consequences of the war on drugs as it is fought in Bolivia.
Women in rural areas like the Chapare have no other comparable
economic opportunities to make a living that is not related to coca
production. The leader of the Women Farmer's Union in the
region expresses:
[Cloca is our economy. The leaf knows our hunger, our
thirst, our lack of clothing, and our need for education. If I
sell coca, I can go to the hospital. If I sell coca, I can buy
school supplies for my children. If I sell coca, I can buy
food.
10 1
The political tool adopted by the government to manage
this situation is alternative development - a plan that in
words seems like a viable solution, but in practice remains
to be effective.
a. Alternative Development Programs - Reality or
Illusion?
Alternative development takes its form in crop substitution
and socio-economic development."' 2 Although the Bolivian govern-
ment, the United States, and the United Nations have supported
the policy of rural development, there is not much to show for it
for various reasons. First, coca is more economically attractive
than any other crop, producing four crops a year at lucrative
prices. Second, coca is appropriate to the socio-economic condi-
tions in Bolivia, requiring little technology and much manual
labor. Although the government has attempted to persuade farm-
99. See id.
100. Schwimmer, supra note 96.
101. Mackay, supra note 17.
102. See Policy Options: What Is To Be Done?, supra note 3.
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ers to switch to alternative crops like bananas or pineapples,
many have chosen not to switch,"'3 partly because coca keeps
much longer than other crops and thus its sale is not hindered by
the country's poor infrastructure. Third, the market potential for
alternative crops and the viability of other alternative develop-
ment programs have not been adequately researched, resulting in
ill-conceived programs lacking support and adoption from the
local coca grower representatives. 10 4 Fourth, many of the funds
allocated for structural adjustment programs are being spent for
balance-of-payment support (resulting from structural adjustment
programs) and rural electrification, both of little benefit to poor
coca growers." 5 Hence, the lack of viable solutions limits the crea-
tion of economic opportunities for coca growers. Now that there
are no more coca fields in the Chapare, the same can be said
regarding employment opportunities for approximately 60,000
farmers living in the Chapare: "the great question mark is what
the former coca producers will live from."106
B. Social Unrest and Civilian Protests
United States-imposed anti-drug policies and the conse-
quences of human rights violations, overcrowded jails, and lack of
opportunities for earned income has led Bolivia to its worst politi-
cal and social crisis since the advent of a democratic government
in 1983. Law 1008 and Plan Dignidad have caused civil uproar
ranging from nationwide protests to road blockades, hunger
strikes, and multiple instances of violence. In September 2000,
farmers unions blocked one of Bolivia's major highways for
twenty-seven days, demanding a halt to the zero coca goal."0 7 Two
months later women farmers formed unions resembling the men's,
holding demonstrations and blockades to protest government
repression and the obliteration of their crops.' To protest condi-
103. See James Reynolds, Bolivia Wages War on the Coca Leaf, BBC NEWS ONLINE,
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/americas/newsid_778000/778100.stm (June
9, 2000) (last visited Sept. 7, 2001).
104. See Potter & Farthing, supra note 28.
105. See id. In 2001, the $85 million allocated by the Unites States for alternative
development programs was mostly spent on these expenses. Id.
106. Drugs and Development #19, supra note 1. The author relates the story of
MILKA, a milk factory established in the Chapare with funds from the Swedish
government and initially managed by the United Nations as an example of the failure
of alternative development programs. Id.
107. See Mackay, supra note 17.
108. Id. Hundreds of poor traveled to the city of Cocachamba to protest the arrest
of women leaders who were also coca farmers; the protest lasted seventeen days. Id.
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tions in women's prisons, the women have organized horrific dem-
onstrations, one of which involved ten women who tied their
hands and feet to iron bars on a balcony and crucified themselves
for up to nine days without food while the rest of the inmate popu-
lation supported them with a hunger strike."9
Weeks of civil violence and road blockades in the end of 2000
caused Bolivia's economic activity to decline by nearly half."0
Massive protests were successful in getting at least one demand
granted by the government - abandonment of the plan to build
three Bolivian Army brigade headquarters in the Chapare (at a
cost of $6.4 million, care of the U.S. counter-drug budget under
§1004 of the National Defense Authorization Act) to maintain mil-
itary presence after the eradication campaign.'1 1 Civil protests
continued into 2001 seeking the enforcement of other agreements
made by the government after the uprisings of 2000. Protests are
being led by coalitions of coca growers, trade unionists, water
protestors, teachers, and peasants.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The goal of eradicating coca in Bolivia, at least in the Chapare
region, has proved to be an attainable goal. Coca has been suc-
cessfully eradicated, but at a high price. The economic and social
costs resulting from Law 1008 and Plan Dignidad are too high a
price to pay for an overall unsuccessful war on drugs. Continuous
civil protests for years should give signal to systemic problems in
anti-drug policies. The United States must take different steps in
the creation of a new foreign policy, taking heed of societal con-
cerns that have been brushed off for far too long."1
It is unrealistic to expect that the United States will cease its
war on drugs. The United States is obstinately committed to the
policy, even though many have criticized how it is fought both
domestically and abroad.1 Since the United States will likely
109. See id. Four women "sewed their lips shut, refusing to eat or drink." Id.
110. See 2000 Country Reports, supra note 5.
111. Colombia - Overview: U.S. Security Assistance to the Andean Region, 2000-
2001, supra note 35.
112. The United States cannot continue to ignore the social unrest its policies are
causing and the increased perception of the United States by Bolivians as invading
their sovereignty. Ignoring the protests "risks fomenting what it has always sought to
repress: a leftist, anti-American revolutionary movement like the one that Che
Guevara attempted to create in Bolivia three decades ago." Potter & Farthing, supra
note 28.
113. See generally Arthur L. Berney, Cocaine Prohibition: Drug-Induced Madness
in the Western Hemisphere, 15 B.C. THiRD WORLD L.J. 19 (1995). Berney discusses
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maintain its focus on the supply side of the drug problem, recom-
mendations are limited to the acceptance of the United States'
imposition of demands upon the Bolivian government.
A. Aim at a New Target: Poverty
The United States' policies in Bolivia should target the real
root of the problem of illicit drug crops and trafficking: poverty.
Alternative development programs must cease to be figures of pol-
itician's imaginations. In an initial step towards improving the
dire economic conditions of Bolivia, the United States and other
industrialized nations discounted Bolivia's debt servicing by
twenty-seven percent in 2000, easing the burden of foreign debt on
the country."4 But this is not enough. The United States needs to
invest in the education and economic development of the nation if
it wishes to prevent the balloon effect of drug crops and the inef-
fectiveness of foreign anti-narcotics policy.
115
In designing alternative development programs and other
viable solutions to the extreme poverty in Bolivia, it is necessary
to empower the population and allow its members to be involved
in the political process, rather then merely existing at the receiv-
ing end of foreign policy. The Andean Council of Coca Leaf Grow-
ers calls for support of proposals, maintaining that "to achieve
these proposals a serious commitment of governments and inter-
national cooperation agencies is necessary, but the resources des-
tined for this must be channeled directly to the campesino
producers organized in union, federations, associations, boards
and fronts."1 ' Providing economic assistance to existing organiza-
tions of local people and working with them in drafting and imple-
menting a solution will not only work best for Bolivian peasants
but also for the United States. The United States would benefit
from such a collaborative effort by diminishing, if not eliminating,
Bolivians' perceptions of the United States as an imposing govern-
various reasons why the U.S. government is unlikely to change its prohibition policy
anytime in the near future.
114. See Potter & Farthing, supra note 28.
115. See Policy Options: What is to be done?, supra note 3. The balloon effect
-"what is punched down in one place. . .springs up in another"- refers to the
phenomenon that one region's success in curtailing production of illicit drugs will only
become another region's problem as dealers and intermediaries move to places of
decreased resistance and increased opportunity. Id.
116. Statement of the Andean Coca Producers at the U.N. Special Session on
Drugs, NY, (June 1998) available at http://www.tni.org/drugs/ungass/cocal.htm (last
visited Sept. 24, 2001).
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ment, possibly preventing a future massive civil outcry of worse
magnitude than the protests that have already taken place.
B. Support the Amendment of Law 1008 and
Eliminate Certification
The Bolivian government is prevented from modifying Law
1008 because of the United States' pressure to follow its anti-drug
policies, as illustrated by the certification process. The United
States has the responsibility of withdrawing its support of a law
that is plainly unconstitutional and in violation of international
law, instead allowing and promoting the law's amendment. Law
1008 needs to be amended so that it permits bail, allows for the
freedom of those detained and declared innocent during the
appeal process, takes power away from anti-narcotics forces and
mandates their display of identification cards, establishes clear
circumstances under which searches and seizures are allowed,
and establishes a set of procedures to manage reports of abuses.
Amendment of the law should take into consideration its dis-
criminatory effects against the poor and against women. If the
United States wishes to continue its support of strict sentencing
guidelines for coca growers and traffickers, foreign assistance
should be conditional on Bolivia's assurance that the prison sys-
tem is modified to manage overcrowding. Moreover, the Unites
States must ensure that the country establishes government-
funded orphanages and other children's services departments in
order to prevent the unintended incarceration of children and to
appease the parents' fears that their children will grow up fending
for themselves on the streets.
In addition to supporting the amendment of Law 1008, the
United States must domestically reform, if not repeal, the annual
drug certification process. Certification is not conducive to cooper-
ation between governments and community groups, but is rather
an imposition that forces countries to meet certain requirements
in order to get much needed funding. Where the U.S. gives no
other option but to meet the requirements and cooperate with U.S.
drug policy, a militarized drug control strategy arises that, with-
out any preventive measures or safety nets to undermine abuse
and violence, results in the U.S. requirements being met at the
expense of human rights.
C. Stop the Promotion of Militarization
United States foreign assistance to Bolivia should not pro-
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mote the increased militarization of regions in which eradication
of coca is the goal. Militarization funded by U.S. economic assis-
tance increases the weariness and distrust of the United States
and of the Bolivian government. Additionally, it creates room for
further abuse of human rights and violence and for the continued
targeting of the poor peasants rather than the drug lords. The
United States should shift its funding, thereby increasing social
and economic aid while decreasing aid to military and police. Sur-
prisingly, the opposite is taking place, with an estimated military
and police aid increase of twenty percent and a four percent
decrease in social and economic aid in 2002 from 2001 levels."7
Social and economic aid in the form of alternative development
programs (formulated by or with feedback from local peasants),
assistance to displaced persons, and support for judicial reform,
administration of justice, and human rights must be increased if
the United States hopes to eradicate drug production on a long-
term basis without eternal sustenance by military barracks in
every corner.
D. Enforce the Leahy Law
In giving security assistance to Bolivia in the form of police
and military aid, the United States must enforce the Leahy Law
to ensure that American dollars are not financing abusive anti-
narcotics forces. The Leahy Law first appeared as part of the 1997
Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, and was originally appli-
cable only to the State Department's International Narcotics Con-
trol (INC) program."' l Since then, it has been broadened to
encompass "all security assistance programs funded through the
Foreign Operations Act" and "training programs authorized under
the Defense Department Appropriations Bill." 19 The provision
has become the "most important legal tool used to promote respect
for human rights through U.S. security assistance programs."120
117. U.S. Military and Police Aid: The 2002 Aid Request, Colombia Project (The
Center For International Policy), at http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/aid02.htm
(last updated May 17, 2001). Estimates made as of May 13, 2001 by the Center for
International Policy.
118. See Prohibitions on Security Assistance: Limitations on Assistance to Security
Forces (The "Leahy Law"), supra note 21. Interestingly, "the Leahy Law originated in
1996 from efforts to control U.S. military aid to Colombia." Defend The Leahy Law,
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA (Issue Brief on the Leahy Law), available at http://
www.amnesty-usa.org/stoparms/issuebrief.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2001).
119. Prohibitions on Security Assistance: Prohibitions on assistance in the FAA and
AECA, supra note 21.
120. Id. The Leahy Law is an important human rights tools because "(1) [ilt
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The Leahy Law prohibits the allocation of most types of U.S.
foreign aid and Defense Department training programs to foreign
security military and police units where there is credible evidence
that a unit carried out human rights violations. The law has thus
far been enforced against units in Turkey and Colombia.12 ' "To
implement the Leahy Law, each U.S. embassy has established a
'vetting procedure' to review the backgrounds of military units for
which assistance has been proposed."'22 Where credible evidence
of abuse exists, funds to that particular unit are denied until the
Secretary of State or the Defense Department determines that
effective measures are being taken to bring security forces to
justice.'23
The problem with the law is that it does not provide who
exactly is responsible for collecting the information necessary to
make a decision." It is also unclear whether every individual in a
unit needs to be screened or whether a collective screening of a
unit is required and how far embassies must screen for human
rights abuses. In Bolivia, there have been some accusations of
DEA cognizance of wrongdoing and abuse by the UMOPAR and
FELCN, raising doubts as to the likelihood that the U.S. embassy
in Bolivia will bring any evidence of human rights violations to
light.
The Leahy Law can nevertheless be enforced in Bolivia in
light of reports of police brutality and abuse by non-governmental
organizations ("NGOs") such as Amnesty International. Once
human rights groups gather credible evidence that a unit has
committed violations and bring it to the embassy's attention, it is
actually keeps weapons out of the hands of human rights abusers; (2) [iut requires
U.S. missions abroad to increase their monitoring of human rights issues; and (3) [i]t
is a law, not a policy guideline." Defend the Leahy Law, supra note 118.
121. Defend the Leahy Law, supra note 118.
122. See Prohibitions on Security Assistance: Prohibitions on assistance in the FAA
and AECA,, supra note 21. The law, however, is not specific as to who is charged with
collecting the information required to make a decision. See. e.g., Dana Priest,
Pentagon Slow to Cooperate With Information Requests, WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 1998, at
A34. Neither an embassy's military group, with direct contact with potentially
violent military units, nor the CIA station chief are specifically required to disclose
relevant information nor participate fully in the vetting process. Id.
123. Much debate arises when funds are prohibited under the Leahy Law, as was
the case in 1998 when the State Department rejected request from a defense
manufacturer in the United States for U.S. financing to help Turkey purchase
armored vehicles. See Dana Priest, New Human Rights Law Triggers Policy Debate,
WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 1998, at A34 [hereinafter New Human Rights Law Triggers
Policy Debate].
124. See Priest, supra note 122, at A34.
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the United States' obligation to follow the Leahy Law and with-
hold the financing of military training programs and weapons for
the unit involved.
The United States, however, should not make the enforce-
ment of the Leahy Law contingent upon NGO's reports and find-
ings of abuse by military units. The government must rather
implement and enforce information-gathering procedures and
make sure that human rights violations do not go undetected. 2 '
The United States should not finance anti-narcotics units that vio-
late human rights. In Bolivia, it is necessary and essential that
violations of human rights do not got unnoticed, particularly in
light of forced crop eradication and the likelihood that abuse has
occurred and will continue to occur with continued militarization
of the region.
The United States perceives Bolivia as a success story, brag-
ging about the effectiveness of coca crop eradication policy in elim-
inating the production of cocaine. Nevertheless, in the process of
eliminating the supply of coca from Bolivia by all means, at the
very least the United States must ensure that practices that
would not be tolerated in its own soil do not take place abroad as a
result of U.S. foreign drug policy. Stripped of one of its most prof-
itable crops, Bolivia should not and cannot be left in shambles by
the United States behind a facade of a victory. Such victory is not
much with so many losers left in the sidelines.
SOLIMAR SANTOS*
125. The State Department set up an interagency task group to discuss how to
implement the Leahy Law, but changes have yet to be made. See New Human Rights
Law Triggers Policy Debate, supra note 123.
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